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Abstract: The fact that social welfare professions including social work, youth work 
and community work deal with the lives and relationships of human beings is far from 
controversial. What is contentious is that in light of increasing intellectual work on the 
nature of social practices there is a failure in the human services literature to adequately 
examine the interdependencies and entanglements between conceptualisations of the 
stuff that the helping professions deals with and understandings of practice. This article 
examines the nexus and mediations between the phenomena and practice of social service 
work. The case is made that human services and the human beings they deal with are often 
imagined and represented in one-dimensional, unambiguous, calculable and orderable 
ways that align with neo-liberal inspired and technical approaches to practice. I argue that 
these accounts are inadequate and I suggest that practices of care and the people engaged 
in such practices should be constituted as complex, unpredictable, wicked and emergent. 
A key to good practice in the people professions is acknowledging and attending to this 
complexity and aporia. 
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Introduction
Accounts of the nature of practices, or practice ontologies, are flourishing 
following the ‘practice turn in contemporary theory’ and growing intellectual 
interest with neo-Aristotelianism (Dunne, 1993; Greene, 2009; Schatzki, Knorr 
Cetina and von Savigny, 2001). One way these practice theories can be deployed 
is to conceptualise good practice in human services (Emslie, 2014; Kemmis and 
Smith, 2008). Something that different practice ontologies have in common is that 
practices ‘consist of interdependencies between diverse elements’ (Shove, Pantzar 
and Watson, 2012, p. 7). According to Reckwitz (2002, p. 249) these interdependent 
elements include ‘forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, “things” 
and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, 
states of emotion and motivational knowledge’. Shove et al. (2012, p. 14) similarly 
argued social practices are made or enacted by people actively combining a number 
of elements, in particular:
materials – including things, technologies, tangible physical entities, and the stuff 
of which objects are made; competences – which encompasses skill, know-how 
and technique; and meanings – in which we include symbolic meanings, ideas and 
aspirations.
On a similar note Schatzki (2012, pp. 14-15; 2002, pp. 77-80) made the case 
that practices feature ‘open-ended, spatially-temporally dispersed nexus of doings 
and sayings’ that are organised by and are expressions of ‘practical rules, [practical] 
understandings, teleoaffective structures, and general understandings’. And, 
according to neo-Aristotelian perspectives practices consist of a correspondence 
between a material that is being dealt with, and a form of knowledge and a type 
of action best suited to deal with the material in question (Aristotle, 2009; Dunne, 
2005; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2004). In this article I examine one element 
that is critical to human service practices, which are the people who human service 
practitioners work with. I explore the question how should we conceptualise the 
stuff that practices of care deal with - the lives and relationships of human beings – 
particularly if we want to achieve good practice in the people professions?
There are good reasons to ask this question. Different accounts of the nature of 
practices have acknowledged that practices deal with stuff or things. For example 
this claim is shared by Schatzki (2012) and Dunne (2005) even though other aspects 
of their conceptualisations of practice differ. According to Schatzki (2012, p. 16);
Just about every practice…deals with material entities (including human bodies) 
that people manipulate or react to. And most practices would not exists without 
materialities of the sorts they deal with, just as most material arrangements that 
practices deal with would not exist in the absence of these practices.
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On a similar note Dunne (2005, p. 378) argued good practice depends upon 
getting clarity on the subject of,
…just what kind of material we deal with...the material will determine the kind of 
activity we are engaged in and, in turn, the kind of knowledge that is required or the 
type of rationality that is appropriate.
When it comes to the caring professions the critical material or phenomena that 
practices such as social work, youth work, aged care and disability care deal with 
are people and their lives and relationships. In light of the significance of this stuff 
to practice of care, if we are serious about conceiving and achieving good practice 
in human services then we need a good conceptualisation of what it is that such 
practices are dealing with.
Carlile, Nicolini, Langley and Tsoukas (2013) similarly suggested that the 
conceptualisations of what it is that practices of social welfare deal with have 
practical, ethical and ontological implications. According to the authors;
…matter does matter because it generates consequences and, therefore, an ethical 
dimension grows out of a natural inquiry into the sources of those consequences…
matter matters not only as an intellectual effort, but also in an ontological and 
practical sense, i.e., it generates consequences for how we experience and act in the 
world. (Carlile et al., 2013, p. 3)
The stuff or things that human services deal with, which I am examining in 
this article, may not be matter in the sense Carlile et al. (2013) proposed. At the 
same time the imaginings and representations of human beings and their lives 
and relationships, which are entities and phenomena that the people professions 
work with, have ethical, practical and ontological consequences of the kinds that 
the authors suggest. Freire (1985) and Kemmis (2008) illustrated the point in the 
field of education. Freire (1985, p. 43) argued, ‘Every educational practice implies a 
concept of man (sic) and the world’, and how these things – ‘man’ and ‘the world’ – 
are constituted are significant for teaching and learning as well as teachers and 
learners. Kemmis (2008) demonstrated just that by arguing that praxis in education 
relies on particular conceptualisations of students.
They are not ‘raw material’ to be moulded into pre-given shapes and lives, but co-
participants in a shared social life, in which we have shared fates. The educator always 
encounters them as persons worthy of the recognition and respect due to the Other. 
(Kemmis, 2008, p. 290)
It is important to acknowledge that there are many material things and different 
kinds of stuff used in and entangled with human service practices. These include 
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technologies such as ICT, instruments including assessment tools, and objects of 
which cars are a good example. Such matter, and how it is conceived and used, 
are important elements for practice in the people professions, but these are not 
the phenomena that are the chief focus of this paper. I concentrate on examining 
the conceptualisations of one thing that is critical to practices of care, and that 
is the people and their lives and relationships that such practices work with and 
for. What’s more I am not simply referring to the aspects of people that have been 
brought into focus recently among practice theorist, namely the physical body, the 
body as a material entity, or ‘nonpropositional bodily abilities’ (Schatzki, 2012, 
pp. 14-16). I begin by examining the human services literature and identify and 
critique typical ways that the stuff and practice of the caring professions is imagined 
and represented. I then explore what these characteristic conceptualisations miss 
and conceal, and I draw on a range of relevant debates in the social sciences to do 
just that. Finally I make a case for how people and their lives and relationships 
should be constituted or constructed if we are interested in achieving good practice 
in social, youth and community work.
Conceptualisations of the stuff and practice of human 
services in the literature
In the human services literature there is generally a failure to adequately acknowledge 
and examine the interdependencies and entanglements between the phenomena 
that the helping professions deal with and understandings of practice. McDonald 
(2006) and Neukrug (2012, pp. 69-82) are an exception and the authors provide 
examples of attempts to make connections between how people or human nature 
are conceived and approaches to human service practice. For example McDonald 
(2006, p. 119) argued the case for five ‘discourses of welfare’ that involved such 
entanglements.
The first of these is the charitable discourse, in which welfare or service delivery is a 
gift or donation directed towards a needy supplicant (usually a member of the deserving 
poor)…The second is the professional discourse…[in which] welfare is a service for 
the client…The third and more contemporary discourse is that of NPM [New Public 
Management] in which welfare is a product for the consumer-citizen…The fourth (also 
contemporary) discourse is that of the market which promotes welfare as a commodity 
for the customer…The final discursive formation of welfare…is that of community, a 
contradictory and confusing set of discourses in which welfare promotes participation 
for the citizen-user… (italics in original) (McDonald 2006, pp. 119-120)
As McDonald demonstrates these accounts fail to make a good case for how we 
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should imagine and represent the lives and relationships of human beings if we 
want to achieve good practice.
Another common problem in the relevant literature is a discrepancy between 
how people and practice are conceived. For example people and their lives and 
relationships are often conceptualised as ambiguous, unpredictable, indeterminate 
and messy. Fook, Ryan and Hawkins (2000) provided such a characterisation of the 
stuff that human services deal with. However these authors subsequently resorted to 
a technical conceptualisation of practice to deal with this phenomenon, which does 
not correspond. In particular they argued good practice involves the application of 
knowledge in practice, which constitutes the matter being dealt with unambiguous, 
predictable and a type of stuff that can be made into something other than what 
it is with the proper use of theory. Fook, Ryan and Hawkins (2000) demonstrated 
that the matter of human service work is often conceptualised as complex in the 
literature, but this is not linked to consistent account of practice. More often there 
is gap in the human services literature. In particular what is missing is an attempt 
to articulate a well-thought out account of the stuff that the people professions deal 
with. Instead accounts of practice imply a conceptualisation of human beings and 
their lives and relationships and what follows are two examples of just that.
Following neo-liberal rationalities of government
The stuff that human services work with is often conceptualised in one-dimensional 
ways that correspond to and reproduce neo-liberal rationalities of government. 
More to the point people are conceived as individual subjects with capacities 
and responsibilities to exercise freedom, autonomy and choice. And this freedom 
enables and requires people to pursue, manage and achieve interests in markets 
along with other autonomous, competitive and self-responsible agents. A key 
function of practices in the caring professions, when they are organized as an 
element of this regime of government, is to elicit, promote, facilitate and foster 
these identities and capabilities (Dean 2010). One way this takes place is with the 
constitution of people engaged with practices of care as customers or consumers 
(McDonald, 2006). Dean (2010) argued social welfare has been reconfigured 
using rationalities and techniques of markets and these reforms contribute to 
the production of such subjects. A problem with these conceptualisations is that 
people’s different experiences of economic and social advantage and disadvantage, 
which impacts on the capacity to make choices, is minimised. Another problem 
is that the responsibility for achieving economic and social well-being is placed 
onto vulnerable individuals, rather political, economic or social institutions and 
conditions.
Another basic conceptualisation of people in the human services literature 
that is entangled with neo-liberal forms of government is as cases or risks to be 
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managed (Rose, 1999). In this instance, individual subjects have inadequately 
demonstrated the exercise of freedom, autonomy and choice. Subsequently they 
are ‘at-risk’ and need the ‘case-management’ support of social services to ‘erase 
risky behaviours’ and to nurture and enhance capacities to manage themselves and 
pursue interests in responsible ways (Dean, 2010, p. 195). Again economic, social 
and political differences are erased, and individual responsibility for addressing 
inequality, disadvantage and vulnerability is emphasized. In Australia we have also 
witnessed the superficial and condemnatory characterisations of people who use 
social services as ‘dole bludgers’, welfare dependents, ‘leaners’, and the undeserving 
poor (Hockey, 2014). The problem with these conceptualisations is that they are 
dehumanising, demeaning and demonising of people who demonstrate a need for 
and are engaged with human services. At the same time such portrayals of people 
align with neo-liberal rationalities of government. In particular they discourage 
the reliance on government funded social services. They also justify more intensive 
interventions and surveillance by governments to promote self-responsibility and 
the desirable exercise of freedom.
Objects of modern science and technology
Another way people are imagined and represented in the human services literature 
is as stuff that can be observed, measured, explained and dominated by intellect 
and reason. In particular what it is that the caring professions deal with is conceived 
as something that is ‘inevitable, essential, self-evident and universal’, and that can 
be unambiguously, completely and objectively known (Dahlberg and Moss, 2013). 
These ways of conceptualising people correspond to Heidegger’s (1977) account 
of the essence of modern technology as a mode of revealing, which he called 
Enframing.
Enframing…demands that nature…reports itself in some way or other that is 
identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of 
information. (Heidegger 1997, p. 23)
Heidegger (1997) suggested a danger of Enframing is that people conceive 
themselves and other people as calculable and orderable. Constituted or revealed 
as being completely knowable, explainable and predictable make human beings 
amenable to submission, mastery and exploitation by human ingenuity. Put another 
way, people are thought of in ways that resemble raw material like stone or wood 
that can be efficiently crafted or engineered with the application of the right sort 
of rational and scientific aka positivist knowledge. Conceptualisations of people 
as stuff that can have practice done to and on them are entangled with linear, 
prescriptive and deterministic approaches to practice that are typically referred to 
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as technical, instrumental, standardized, managerial, rule-based, and procedurally 
orientated. This includes evidence-based practice, outcomes-based practice 
frameworks, risk-based approaches to practice, transferable skills handbooks, and 
instruction manuals (Hamilton, 2005; Schon, 1987, 1991). Other examples include 
practice based on psychological and neuroscientific theories of human beings 
(Bessant and Watts, 2012; Milevsky, 2014)
Such approaches to conceiving people and practice are common and actively 
embraced and pursued by governments and human service providers because of 
their promise to improve cost-efficiency and enhance service effectiveness. The 
social sciences and affiliated researchers and practitioners also have a long history 
of imagining and representing the human as ‘objects of science’ as a way to gain 
intellectual legitimacy on par with the natural sciences (Olsen, 2013, p. 175). 
Moreover there have been desperate and enduring attempts in much social research 
and theory to transfer and apply the methods of the positivist natural sciences, used 
to conceptualise and explain a solid, certain, immutable, predictable, and rule-
following account of matter, onto things and entities such as culture, the social, 
morality, and people and their lives and relationships (Dunne, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 
2001; Polkinghorne, 2004). If the conceptualisations of people and practice inspired 
by neo-liberal rationalities of government and modern science and technology are 
inadequate then how should they be imagined and represented?
Exploring other ways of conceiving what it is that human 
services deal with
Conceptualisations of the stuff and practice of human service work that are 
inspired by and entangled with neo-liberal rationalities of government and 
technical approaches to practice miss and, according to Heidegger (1977), conceal 
ways of imagining and representing people and their lives and relationships. A 
range of relevant debates within the social sciences demonstrate just that and 
these controversies suggest that what it is that the people professions deals with 
is different and more than being one-dimensional, unambiguous, calculable and 
orderable.
A fixed structure of meaning or an effect of power/knowledge
Contemporary cultural studies have undermined the idea that people are born 
into the world already formed with, for example, an innate and natural potential 
for good or bad. According to Mansfield (2000, p. 11) there is a consensus amongst 
theorists since Heidegger that the subject is constructed rather than an authentic, 
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autonomous and naturally occurring thinking, feeling and acting thing. Mansfield 
(2000) argued there are two broad approaches to theorising the self that have 
dominated the second half of the twentieth century. The subjectivist camp is 
illustrated by Freud, Lacan, and most accounts of psychiatry and psychology. It 
also includes structural accounts of Marxism and feminism, and much subcultural 
theory. This approach;
…attempts to explain the truth of the subject…Its authority rests on the assumption…
that its object of analysis is quantifiable and knowable – in short a real thing, with a 
fixed structure, operating in knowable and predictable patterns…For these theorists, 
the subject has a knowable content, and is measurable against a normative path of 
development. (Mansfield, 2000, pp. 9, 66)
Human service practice that follows and is based on this account of the self 
focuses on supporting, organising and correcting individuals to be normal and 
self-sustaining, including preventing and healing abnormal behaviour. Such 
practice also reproduces the belief that people have an essence and a true, authentic, 
complete, essential and inevitable self that needs to be helped, protected, liberated, 
and empowered in the face of power, oppression, adversity and alienation.
Alternatively, according to anti-subjectivist approaches ‘the subject is an effect 
of power, science or technologies’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. vi). In other words there is 
no true self to be liberated and any account, thought, feeling, or idea of the self is a 
construction emanating from power/knowledge, such as that exercised by human 
service professionals. Proponents of this position include Nietzsche, Foucault, and 
Deleuze and Guattari.
[This] approach to the subject…believes neither that the subject has a fixed or 
knowable content, nor in fact that subjectivity exists outside of the demands power 
places on individual bodies to perform in certain ways. Power, in its drive to 
administer human populations, contrives the subject as an ideal mode of being to 
which we must conform…We are the very material of power, the thing through which 
it finds its expression. (Mansfield, 2000, p. 66, 55)
To put this another way, the idea of subjectivity, ‘has been invented by dominant 
systems of social organisation in order to control and manage us’ (Mansfield, 2000, 
p. 10).
…‘subjectivity’…is the way we are led to think about ourselves, so we will police and 
present ourselves in the correct way, as not insane, criminal, undisciplined, unkempt, 
perverse or unpredictable. (Mansfield, 2000, p. 10)
According to the anti-subjectivist camp any practice of social welfare, which 
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is entangled with a conceptualisation of the human, is a technique of power and 
social administration making demands of and disciplining us. The anti-subjectivist 
position raises insurmountable hurdles for knowing and realising good practice in 
human services. Any conceptualisation of caring work produces and reproduces the 
subject in limited and limiting ways, and caring professionals should be interested 
in examining the conceptualisations they are producing and reproducing, as well 
as the forms of power/knowledge, interests and ideologies these meanings serve. 
The subjectivist anti-subjectivist debate suggests that those who work in the people 
professions should not delude themselves that they are doing good practice.
The natural science and social science distinction
According to the subjectivist approach to theorising the self, people and their lives 
and relationships have a truth that can be observed, measured, explained and 
predicted. The anti-subjectivist position is one critique of this account. Another 
criticism can be found in debates between the natural, physical or theoretical 
sciences and social, human or practical sciences (Blaikie, 2007, pp. 30-55; Egan, 
2010, p. 16-17; Giddens, 1993; Thompson, 2000, pp. 43-53). As previously argued 
many approaches to human service practice conceptualise human beings in 
ways that matter is typically conceptualised in the natural sciences as completely 
knowable and subsequently explainable, calculable, predictable, and tameable. 
Conceived in this way people can be known in decontextualized, universal, value-
free and rule-based ways that are entangled with forms of practice based on such 
knowledge.
However there are many arguments and proponents for conceptualising the 
stuff of human service work as a different to this account (Flyvbjerg, Landman and 
Schram, 2012; Hamilton, 2005). For example, in the eighteenth century Vico (1999, 
p. 114) argued, ‘Sciences must begin at the point where their subject matter begins’, 
and he argued for a distinction between natural sciences that dealt with the physical 
universe, and poetic sciences that focus on the human world. Vico conceptualised 
the substances or stuff of the physical domain and the human realm as distinct and 
deserving of different ways of knowing. Similarly Einstein argued,
...one of the strongest motives that lead men to art and science is escape from everyday 
life with its painful crudity and hopeless dreariness, from the fetters of one's own 
ever-shifting desires. A finely tempered nature longs to escape from the personal life 
into the world of objective perception and thought. (Schweber, 2008, p. 6)
Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 32) agreed arguing there are critical differences between the 
material that the natural and social sciences deals with;
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…the former [natural sciences] studies physical objects while the latter [social 
sciences] studies self-reflecting humans and must therefore take account of changes 
in the interpretations of the objects of study. Stated in another way, in social sciences, 
the object is a subject.
Put simply Chenoweth and McAuliffe (2012, p. 205) argued;
One of the main distinguishing features of human service organisations is the nature 
of the work undertaken – that is, human service work with people rather than with 
objects.
If the things and entities that the people professions deal with are better known for 
their introspective, not always apparent, fluid, ephemeral, self-reflecting, reflexive, 
and emergent meaning making qualities then they are not amenable to the sorts 
of practices that are interdependent with the knowledge traditionally produced by 
the approaches and methods of the hard sciences. Moreover the conceptualisations 
of the stuff of human service work as objects of the natural positivist sciences or 
subjects of an interpretive, critical and phronetic social science have irreconcilable 
epistemological, ethical and practice entanglements and implications. Recent 
accounts of complexity theory, aspects of practice theory, and the conceptualisation 
of the human as cyborg counter and complicate the object/subject split (Blaikie, 
2007, pp. 206-214; Carlile et al., 2013; Haraway, 1991; Introna, 2013; Latour, 2002; 
Schatzki, 2012, pp. 13-24). However these theories typically provide further rebuttal 
to the conventional natural science conceptualisation of matter.
Knowable versus aporia
One of the differences between the positivist and interpretivist conceptualisations of 
human beings is that they are or are not completely knowable. This debate warrants 
further attention. Since Descartes (2009) famously argued ‘I think therefore I am’ 
people have been conceived as individuals with conscious minds that have the 
capacities of intellect and reason that can be put to use to search for, know and 
explain a complete, coherent and consistent truth of the world. This definition 
of the self was a bedrock of the Enlightenment and Rationalism, and remains 
influential. According to Barad (2013, p. 20) humans have an ‘ultimate wish for 
complete knowability’ and conceptualise matter as entirely knowable. Moreover 
Descartes’ Cogito was the precursor to the conceptualisation of the stuff that 
human services deal with as absolutely unambiguously intelligible. This frames the 
problem of knowing and achieving good practice as a problem solving exercise that 
is amenable to right or wrong, correct or false answers. And though this puzzle may 
be complicated, according to this conceptualisation the various elements to achieve 
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good practice, including the stuff that practice deals with, can be broken down and 
linear and predictable relationships between variables established on the basis of 
calculable and calculated probabilities, correlations and causations.
However as Mansfield (2000, p. 20) observed this account of the self relies 
on suppressing and obscuring other dimension of subjectivity, including the 
unconscious, inconsistent, irrational, obscure and unknown. Heidegger and 
Bourdieu are examples of philosophers who argued that people may not be 
immediately aware of why they do what they do, and rational explanations of 
human action can be inadequate. According to Hume passions precede and shape 
reason. And Burke, Midgley and Roberto Unger argued humans have ethical and 
emotional capacities and the intellectual and rational dimensions of self should not 
be privileged. In other words conceiving people and their lives and relationships 
as completely knowable has sustained significant critique and does not stand up to 
scrutiny. More to the point we cannot easily articulate and know everything about 
people and their lives and relationships. Other examples of elements of human 
beings and human service practice that are arational include tacit knowledge, 
intuitions, instincts, gut feelings, passions, emotions, counter-transference, 
unconscious bias, spontaneity, chance, luck or tuche, good timing or kairos, and a 
‘good eye’ (Benner, 1984; Collins, 1990; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Ericsson, 2006; 
Pannabecker, 1994; Polanyi, 1996, 1962; Schon 1991). Other tendencies of humans 
that get in the way of our rational capacities include scotoma, or not seeing bad 
practice, wickedness and ‘shadows’, inertia, and ignorances (Cohen, 2001; Gambrill, 
2013, p. ix; Jung, 1973; Midgley, 1984; Nussbaum 2013). It should as no surprise 
in light of these characterisations of people and practice that Green (2009, p. 11) 
argued professional practice is characterised by aporia, or the confrontation with 
unresolvable problematics, paradoxes, perplexities and impossibilities.
In professional practice there are always moments of undecidability and decision, 
moments when one must act, even if the way forward is not clear, or – more radically 
– is uncertain. (Green, 2009, pp. 11-12)
Imagining and representing people and practice as not completely knowable, 
enigmatic, and unable to be known by reason alone suggests that figuring out and 
doing good caring work is not amenable to right or wrong, correct or false answers. 
Instead such a conceptualisation suggests the problem and the solution are forever 
uncertain and always incomplete, and ‘are part of the same emerging complex 
system which is never fully “present” in any (discrete) moment in time’ (Osberg, 
Biesta and Cillers, 2008, p. 213)
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Simple or complex
A further series of debates echo the controversies just mentioned. The differences 
between conceptualisations of tame and wicked problems and solutions is one 
example (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007 ; Rittel and Webber, 1973). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) contrast between the stable and unified arborescent 
system and the dynamic multidimensional rhizome is another. These distinctions 
resonates with the dissimilarities between characterisations of simple, obvious, 
linear and complicated phenomena, and complex, emergent, non-linear and chaotic 
phenomena (Blaikie, 2007, pp. 206-214). For example Davis and Sumara (2006, 
p. 11) argued;
…although a complicated system might have many components, the relationship 
among those parts is fixed and clearly defined. If it were carefully dismantled and 
reassembled, the system would work in exactly the same way. However, there exist 
some forms that cannot be dismantled and reassembled, whose characters are 
destroyed when the relationships among components are broken. Within these sorts 
of complex systems, interactions of components are not fixed and clearly defined, but 
are subject to ongoing co-adaptations.
Similarly Snowden and Boone (2007, nd) argued;
Simple and complicated contexts assume an ordered universe, where cause-and-
effect relationships are perceptible, and right answers can be determined based on 
the facts. Complex and chaotic contexts are unordered—there is no immediately 
apparent relationship between cause and effect, and the way forward is determined 
based on emerging patterns.
In the same way Schon (1987, p. 3) made the case for a distinction between 
straightforward and difficult problems;
In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground 
overlooking a swamp. On the high ground, manageable problems lend themselves 
to solution through the application of research-based theory and technique. In the 
swampy lowland, messy, confusing problems defy technical solution…in the swamp 
lie the problems of greatest human concern
Barad (2013, p. 18) echoed Schon by contrasting ‘bedrock of solid and certain 
knowledge’ to ‘the swamp of ignorance and uncertainty’. Conceiving the stuff that 
human services deal with as like hard bedrock or a swampy mess are interdependent 
with conceptualisations of good practice as complicated but technically possible 
compared to complex and always uncertain.
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Complex people, complex practice
These debates suggest that the usual ways that the stuff and practice of the people 
professions are imagined and represented are inadequate. In particular human 
services and the human beings they deal with are more than the one-dimensional, 
unambiguous, calculable and orderable conceptualisations that typically feature 
in the relevant literature. The controversies also suggest that the phenomena and 
practice of social, youth and community work are better conceived as complex, 
unpredictable, wicked and emergent. A key to good practice in the people 
professions is acknowledging and attending to this complexity and aporia and a 
number of approaches to practice suggest ways of doing just that. In particular if 
conceptualisations of people and practice are effects of power/knowledge then the 
way subjects and practices are constituted warrants constant reflexive attention 
and value rational deliberation (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
And if conceptualisations of people and practice are interpretive, interest-laden and 
value-based judgments rather than scientific facts then neo-Aristotelian inspired 
approaches to human service practice that promote the role of practical wisdom or 
phronesis may have something valuable to offer (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg, 2011; 
Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010). And if conceptualisations of people and practice are 
wicked and emergent then ongoing attention to detail and context, and continuous 
interpretation and deliberation about problem setting and problem framing is 
worthwhile (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Schon, 1991)
Greene (2001), to some degree following Heidegger’s (1977, p. 25) account of ‘the 
mystery’, also makes a salient point. She argued that in the domain of art there 
is ‘the wonder, the challenge, the surprises…And, yes, the mystery, that goes 
beyond explanation’ (Greene 2001, p. 141). Similarly, when it comes to imagining 
and representing people and human service practice; ‘There is always, always 
more’ (Greene, 2001, p. 14). And any conceptualisation of people and practice is 
limited and limiting. People are always more than any construction that forecloses 
possibility such as equations to be solved, objects to be produced, machines to be 
optimized, matter to be mastered and controlled, or investments to render future 
benefit. People are always more than any label, and they are always more than 
any conceptualisation such as being programmable like computers or stuff that 
can be manipulated, fashioned, controlled, exploited, mechanized, designed or 
engineered into things. Similarly good human service practice is always more than 
the reductionist and limited ways of thinking about and doing caring work inspired 
by neo-liberal forms of government, technical rationality, and positivist natural 
sciences that suggest everything can be unambiguously and completely known, 
ordered, controlled, planned, predicted, and streamlined.
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Conclusion
According to recent accounts of practice theory the way people and their lives 
and relationships are conceived is entangled and interdependent with how 
practices of care are constructed and enacted. This logic suggests that a critical 
element for achieving good practice in youth and community work is a good 
conceptualisation what it is that such practices deal with. I argued that in the 
human services’ literature representations of the stuff that people professions 
deal with are often flawed. The lives and relationships of human beings are 
often constituted in one dimensional ways that follow and reproduce neo-liberal 
rationalities of government. And they are constructed as phenomena that can 
be unambiguously and completely known and that is amenable to technical 
approaches to practice. And there are discrepancies and inadequacies with how 
people and practice are conceived.
I explored a range of debates on the nature of what it is that the people 
professions work with. These controversies suggested that there is no 
certain, solid, ordered, objective, absolute, factual, perfect, eternal, universal, 
unchanging account of people. Instead human beings and their lives and 
relationships are better imagined and represented as wicked, complex, 
emergent, non-linear, difficult, forever uncertain, and always incomplete. 
Furthermore any construction is an interpretation that is prejudiced, interest-
laden and value-based. In light of these disagreements and possibilities I argued 
that the nature of the things and practice of human service work should be 
conceptualised as complex, unpredictable, wicked and emergent. I suggested a 
key to good practice in the people professions is acknowledging and attending 
to this complexity and aporia, and I provided examples of approaches to practice 
that aim to do just that. There is a need for further research how those who are 
interested in achieving good practice in caring work can and should work with 
phenomenon that is forever uncertain and always incomplete.
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